Are We Causally Redundant? Eliminativism and the no-Self View
Are We Causally Redundant? Eliminativism and the no-Self View
Author(s): Jiri BenovskySubject(s): Epistemology
Published by: KruZak
Keywords: Eliminitivism; material objects; Trenton Merricks; consciousness; causality;
Summary/Abstract: Some friends of eliminativism about ordinary material objects such as tables or statues think that we need to make exceptions. In this article, I am interested in Trenton Merricks’ claim that we need to make an exception for us, conscious beings, and that we are something over and above simples arranged in suitable ways, unlike tables or statues. I resist this need for making an exception, using the resources of four-dimensionalism.
Journal: Croatian Journal of Philosophy
- Issue Year: XVII/2017
- Issue No: 49
- Page Range: 1-8
- Page Count: 8
- Language: English
- Content File-PDF
