On Understanding Through Agent-based Models
On Understanding Through Agent-based Models
Author(s): Richard David-RusSubject(s): Philosophy, Special Branches of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
Published by: Институт по философия и социология при БАН
Keywords: understanding; explanation; agent-based models
Summary/Abstract: The aim of this paper is to argue that it is more plausible to approach understanding from a special type of model—the ABS/IBMs models—as a non-explanatory form following some suggestions advanced by Lipton. I will first look to the type of explanation that some authors claimed is disclosed by these models: Weisberg’s analysis of IBMs in ecology and Grüne-Yanoff’s analysis of the Anasazi model. I argue that their analyses fail to show that these models qualify as explanatory understandings. This brings us to Strevens’ “simple view,” which claims the existence of a correct explanation behind any understanding, and his strategy of dismissing the challenges posed by non-explanatory forms. I argue that this strategy incurs damaging costs on his view. In the last part we turn to Khalifa’s critique on Lipton’s proposals and argue that it is based on an unjustified construal of Lipton’s framework. I show how Khalifa’s “argumentative strategy” fails to establish the superiority of actual understanding over possible explanation.
Journal: Balkan Journal of Philosophy
- Issue Year: IX/2017
- Issue No: 1
- Page Range: 53-62
- Page Count: 10
- Language: English