O rzekomej iluzoryczności jaźni i wolnej woli
Concerning the supposed illusoriness of the self and free will
Author(s): Józef BremerSubject(s): Epistemology, Ontology
Published by: Uniwersytet Ignatianum w Krakowie
Keywords: iluzja; intuicje potoczne; jaźń; kompatybilizm; neuronauki; wolna wola
Summary/Abstract: Many philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists argue for the thesis that both the self and free will — as commonly understood by us — are illusions created by our nervous system. An example of such a line of argument can be found in Bruce Hood’s book The Self Illusion: How the Social Brain Creates Identity. I first consider the main ideas put forward by Hood in support of the view that the self and free will are illusions. Then I turn to criticisms of his arguments regarding the illusoriness of the self, citing arguments from philosophy and neuroscience. In criticizing his arguments for the illusoriness of free will, I advocate compatibilism and seek to focus on the elucidation of research into our everyday intuitions relating to free will.
Journal: Rocznik Filozoficzny Ignatianum
- Issue Year: 23/2017
- Issue No: 1
- Page Range: 22-47
- Page Count: 26
- Language: Polish