Ważenie wartości w prawie a problem ich absolutności i relatywności
The weighing of values in law and the problem of their absoluteness and relativity

Summary/Abstract: The objective of this article is to provide an answer to the question: ‘Is there an essential relationship between the weighing of values in law and the rejection of the possibility of the existence of absolute values?’ In other words, we can ask whether the fact alone of weighing values in law implies the relativity of these values. The author, following Heinrich Hubmann, proposes a distinction between the absoluteness of values themselves and the relativisation of their weight in an instance of specific application. She argues that the weighing of values does not exclude the existence of absolute values and that the feature of absoluteness belongs to basic and widely applicable values. However, in an instance where conflict arises between them, their weight may vary, depending on the specific circumstances. The author concludes that relativisation concerns not a value itself, which remains an absolute value, but its weight within the context of the requirements of different values and the requirements stemming from the nature of things.

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