HORIZON AND VISION. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL IDEA OF EXPERIENCE VERSUS THE METAPHYSICS OF SIGHT
HORIZON AND VISION. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL IDEA OF EXPERIENCE VERSUS THE METAPHYSICS OF SIGHT

Summary/Abstract: Can the nature of «vision» be captured by a metaphysics of sight or only by a phenomenological descriptionof «seeing»? Furthermore, the relation between a metaphysics of sight and a Phenomenologyof «seeing» can be presented in two different ways: a relation of continuity as well as of opposition.The first one takes necessarily the Phenomenology of «seeing» as only preparatory for the Metaphysicsof sight as such. The second one affirms that we have to do with two opposite ways of questioningthe nature of the prominent approach of mankind to the world, the theôrein. The aim of this paper is toshow how this second way is possible if and only if we affirm that the Phenomenology of «seeing» isa method to keep away the problems and the paradoxes of the first way and of an a-critical acceptationof the metaphysics of sight. What provides to give to Phenomenology of «seeing» an anti-metaphysicalcommitment is the idea of horizon as transcendental structure of «seeing». Seeing as «experiencing»as well as «theorizing» became a contextual seeing, essentially related to a contextual situation. Moregenerally, each appearance (phainomenon) consists of a whole system of appearances that are contentlessbut are also potential manifestations of the same type. The structure of possibility of horizon isa modal (not substantial) structure, denying any possible statement concerning the metaphysical natureof seeing or the possibility of a «metaphysical» seeing as such.

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