Czy psychologia potoczna jest mechanistycznie neutralna?
Is Folk Psychology Mechanistically Neutral?
Author(s): Robert PoczobutSubject(s): History of Philosophy, Philosophical Traditions, Special Branches of Philosophy
Published by: Uniwersytet Warszawski - Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii, Instytut Filozofii
Keywords: folk psychology; propositional attitudes; mechanistic explanation; cognitive science; cognitive representation
Summary/Abstract: The aim of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of Paweł Gładziejewski’s position presented in chapter five of his book "Wyjaśnianie za pomocą reprezentacji mentalnych. Perspektywa mechanistyczna (Explaining with Mental Representations. A Mechanistic Perspective)". The chapter, entitled "Reprezentacjonizm w kognitywistyce a problem naturalizacji intencjonalności (Representationalism in Cognitive Science and the Problem of Naturalizing Intentionality)", is devoted to the status of folk psychology and propositional attitudes in the context of the mechanistic model of explanation in cognitive science. The paper also contains a sketch of an alternative naturalistic account of propositional attitudes compatible with the mechanistic model of representational explanation.
Journal: Filozofia Nauki
- Issue Year: 25/2017
- Issue No: 3 (99)
- Page Range: 101-117
- Page Count: 17
- Language: Polish
