Чекић Или Наковањ? Немачка После Прве Мароканске Кризе 1905/06
The Hammer or The Anvil? Germany After The First Maroccan Crisis (1905-1906)

Summary/Abstract: The essential problem of Germany’s international position after unification was its disproportionately great strength in comparison with other powers and the fact that this disproportion was constantly increasing. That trend was to continue right up to 1914. Germany was not only stronger than any other European power individually, but it was also capable to single-handedly take on even a coalition of several other powers, as it was to be amply demonstrated in World War I. Immediately after the unification, Bismarck realized the fear that Germany instilled in its neighbours and the potential negative consequences this fear could have for Germany itself. Consequently, he attempted to adapt his foreign policy to these circumstances, making it moderate and cautious, with the goal of preserving the situation created after 1871. However, soon after Bismarck left, the Kaiser’s diplomacy tore down the basic postulates of his foreign policy. As if that was not enough, a policy was launched, designated as Weltpolitik, although no one defined that concept, or connection of that policy with German national interest. Bismarck’s successors did not have clearly defined national interests for Germany to pursue. They thoughtlessly and irrationally reduced the entire foreign policy to a simple an illogical choice between two alternatives. So as not to be an “anvil” in European politics, Germany had to be a “hammer”. An unavoidable consequence of such a policy was the rapid deterioration of relations with other Great Powers. The great speed with which the process of degradation of the international position of Germany was progressing at the beginning of the 20th century was equal to the speed of its military and economic growth. In 1890, just about every experienced European diplomat would have jeered and shaken his head at the thought of an alliance between Britain, France and Russia. In 1906 at Algeciras it could be seen that such an alliance was definitely going to become a reality. It is an irony of history that for the greater part this alliance was not the work of some diplomat from one of the member states, but of the very nation against which it was directed. In his time, Bismarck had been faced with the possibility of an alliance of that kind and he made every attempt to avoid its consequences – the surrounding and isolation of Germany. Now the German politicians were faced with the reality of that alliance, and in 1905, they made the first in a series of attempts to break that encirclement and thus eliminate negative consequence of their restless, erratic, inconsistent and incalculable foreign policy. But to no avail. The last such attempt would lead into World War I.

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