Czy monady mają części? Witkiewicz i jego krytyka mereologii jako ontologii
Have Monads Any Parts? Witkiewicz on Mereology as Ontology

Summary/Abstract: This paper reconstructs Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz’s understanding of logic,accentuating the differences in his evaluation of logic and systems of ‘logistics’.Leśniewski’s theory of collective sets (mereology) exemplifies logistics as understoodby Witkiewicz. I present an outline of Leśniewski’s nominalism, whichentails a belief in a non-abstract nature of sets. I focus on these features of mereologythat could have led Witkiewicz to interpreting it as an ontological system.Witkacy (Witkiewicz’s penname) was skeptical of the usefulness of formal systems(or logistics), and of mereology in particular, for the purposes of designing a unifiedontological system describing essential properties of objects (the world). Accordingto Witkiewicz, such formal systems assumed the role of ontology but severelylacked in philosophical justification. I argue that regardless of his nominalism andcorporeal conception of individuals, mereology cannot be considered a formal theoryof Witkiewicz’s monads.

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