THE SCOPE OF THE TRUTHMAKER REQUIREMENT
THE SCOPE OF THE TRUTHMAKER REQUIREMENT
Author(s): Adam Shmarya LovettSubject(s): Analytic Philosophy
Published by: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti
Summary/Abstract: Truths require truthmakers, many think. In this paper I will discuss the scope of this requirement. Truthmaker maximalism is the claim that, necessarily, all truths require truthmakers. I shall argue against this claim. I shall argue against it on the basis of its implications. I shall first consider its implications when applied to synthetic, contingent propositions. If the truthmaker requirement applies to these propositions, so I shall argue, it is not possible for there to be nothing, and it is not possible for any (possibly) accompanied entity to exist on its own. I shall then consider its implications when applied to modal propositions, specifically those concerning possible existence. I shall argue that if the truthmaker requirement applies to such propositions, then there can be no relation which is equivalent to metaphysical explanation, which – I shall suggest – amounts to a denial of the existence of grounding.
Journal: Revista Română de Filosofie Analitică
- Issue Year: VIII/2014
- Issue No: 2
- Page Range: 23-39
- Page Count: 17
- Language: English