Free Speech in the Jurisprudence of the Romanian Constitutional Court: between Personal Dignity and Anti-Discrimination
Free Speech in the Jurisprudence of the Romanian Constitutional Court: between Personal Dignity and Anti-Discrimination

Summary/Abstract: The article addresses the topic of limiting free speech in cases of insult, libel and hate speech. It aims for a thorough review of the philosophical literature on the topic, as well as of the relevant national and international jurisprudence. The first part of the article summarizes the philosophical debate on the proper boundary between free speech and hate speech. Authors such as Ronald Dworkin and Thomas Scanlon argue in favor of a wide margin for the freedom of speech, grounding their views in the value of autonomy. On the other hand, philosophers such as Katharine McKinnon, Abigail Levin and Caleb Yong criticize this approach, showing that allowing hate speech only enshrines already existent racism and sexism into law. The second part of the article analyzes decisions of the United States Supreme Court, European Court of Human Rights and Romanian Constitutional Court. While the former moved from a restrictive to a permissive approach, the latter courts expressly forbid hate speech and libel in the name of the “rights and reputation of others”. Finally, the article concludes by re-interpreting the metaphor of the “marketplace of ideas”, arguing that hate speech should be forbidden, while libel or insult should be considered a form of free speech.

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