THE PREEMINENT NECESSITY OF PRUDENCE
THE PREEMINENT NECESSITY OF PRUDENCE
Author(s): Brian KempleSubject(s): Social Philosophy
Published by: International Étienne Gilson Society
Keywords: prudence; counsel; deliberation; virtue; practical reasoning; practical judgment; Thomas Aquinas;
Summary/Abstract: Thomas Aquinas holds not only that prudence, the virtue of right practical reasoning, is necessary for living well, but emphatically asserts that it “is the virtue most necessary to human life.” This essay argues that the force of Thomas’ assertion should not be understood as simply contradicting the objection—that “it seems that prudence is not a virtue necessary to living a good life”—with vigor, but rather, as we intend to show, that although all the moral virtues are necessary for the good life, there is a superior importance to the need for prudence, as that whereby the parts of virtuous living are not merely stacked up like building blocks of moral righteousness, but coalesced into a complete whole. To make clear the reasons for this preeminent necessity, we shall first consider the parts and constitution of prudence itself, its relationship to the other virtues, and conclude with its principal act, praeceptum.
Journal: Studia Gilsoniana
- Issue Year: 6/2017
- Issue No: 4
- Page Range: 549-572
- Page Count: 24
- Language: English