Kaip įmanoma fenomenologinė – pragmatistinė tiesos samprata?
How is the Phenomenological – Pragmatist Conception of Truth Possible?

Summary/Abstract: In this article it is argued that the phenomenological – pragmatist conception of truth is possible when it is grounded by human experience and usefulness for a human. It is shown that the phenomenological – the pragmatist conception of truth is dissociated from objectivist pretensions in two ways: firstly as a method defined by subjective experience and, secondly, as a field of insight, situated not in objectivity but in experience itself. Reformulating the phenomenological principle in a way that it would coincide with the pragmatist one, it can be said that to experience something as something means to use something as something. This exact relation of experience and usefulness constitutes truth as an applied conception.

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