Saying without Knowing What or How
Saying without Knowing What or How
Author(s): Elmar UnnsteinssonSubject(s): Phonetics / Phonology, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
Published by: KruZak
Keywords: Implicit reference; propositional attitudes; omissions; intentionalism; transparency; phonology;
Summary/Abstract: In response to Stephen Neale (2016), I argue that aphonic expressions, such as PRO, are intentionally uttered by normal speakers of natural language, either by acts of omitting to say something explicitly, or by acts of giving phonetic realization to aphonics. I argue, also, that Gricean intention-based semantics should seek divorce from Cartesian assumptions of transparent access to propositional attitudes and, consequently, that Stephen Schiffer’s so-called meaning-intention problem is not powerful enough to banish alleged cases of over-intellectualization in contemporary philosophy of language and mind.
Journal: Croatian Journal of Philosophy
- Issue Year: XVII/2017
- Issue No: 51
- Page Range: 351-382
- Page Count: 32
- Language: English
- Content File-PDF