Efektywność przetargów z punktacją uzależnioną od średniej oferty
The efficiency of the average scoring rule in multi-criteria auctions

Summary/Abstract: The amendment of the Polish Public procurement law on 22.06.2016 enforced the application of multi-criteria auctions, by severely limiting the possibility to use price as the only criterion in public procurement. For that purpose a dominant approach is the utilization of a scoring auction, in which the winner is the bidder with the highest total score, calculated for all the criteria involved. Some entrepreneurs avail of the scoring rules that base the evaluation of a bid on its relative performance, compared to the lowest, highest, or average bid made. As a consequence the resulting auction becomes less transparent, as bidders a priori cannot estimate the number of points that they will receive. The paper discusses the theretical properties of such a function, as well as looks into the results of the actual procurements, using the data and algorithm by PKP PLK S.A.

• Details
• Contents