Co nowego w filozoficznym problemie matematyczności przyrody?
What is new in the philosophical problem of why the material world has mathematical structure?

Summary/Abstract: surrounding problems in order to get to the very core of „the mathematicality of the matter”. First I argue that physics cannot establish whether the matter might not be subject to mathematical laws of nature, then I discuss two conceptions of the nature of the physical law, the dualistic and monistic one. It seems that independently of which conception is true, none of these helps to solve the problem. In conjunction with the famous Wigner’s article of 1960 on unreasonable effectivenessof mathematics in natural sciences I indicate that the problem concerns solely the inanimate matter and does not apply to living organisms. As a next inevitable step I discuss the view of mathematics as intellectual inquiries independent of the physical world, which nonetheless perfectly fit this world; in particular I briefly present the Einstein’s conception of forming physical laws. Finally I make comments on the problem which unavoidably appears in this context, namely of whether mathematical notions are discovered or freely created; I indicate (following A. Pelczar and others) that these two concepts do not exclude each other. After this journey through a collection of problems closely accompanying that of „the mathematicality of the matter” it turns out that we come back to the starting point and we are helplessly facing the Mystery.

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