Przeciw dualizmowi psycho-fizycznemu. Analiza i porównanie stanowisk Johna Searle'a i George'a Lakoffa
Against psycho-physical dualism. An Analysis and comparison of George Lakoff's and John Searle's accounts
Author(s): Daniel MilewskiSubject(s): Epistemology, Logic, Social Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
Published by: Copernicus Center Press
Keywords: John Searle; George Lakoff; Rene Descartes; mind-body problem; biological naturalism; embodied mind; cognitive metaphor; first-person ontology; philosophy of mind; philosophy of cognitive science;
Summary/Abstract: This paper discusses John Searle’s biological naturalism and George Lakoff’s embodied mind hypothesis. These theories are presented as examples of a certain part of the philosophy of mind that breaks with the tradition launched by Descartes. In both cases, the break from this tradition is indicated to be a radical one as the theories argue not only against Cartesian dualism - the basic philosophical categories utilized by Descartes are being questioned. This attempt of departure from distinctions that seem to form a great part of the contemporary philosophy of mind may stand for a chance to provide a new perspective for some old philosophical problems.
Journal: Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
- Issue Year: 2014
- Issue No: 56
- Page Range: 57-92
- Page Count: 36
- Language: Polish