The cognitive status of a theory: F. Bonsack's epistemological realism Cover Image

Status poznawczy teorii: realizm epistemologiczny w ujęciu F. Bonsacka
The cognitive status of a theory: F. Bonsack's epistemological realism

Author(s): Jerzy Kaczmarek
Subject(s): Philosophy of Science
Published by: Copernicus Center Press
Keywords: François Bonsack; Ferdinand Gonseth; conditions of cognition; epistemological realism; référentiels;

Summary/Abstract: This paper puts forward mainly F. Bonsack's and Gonseth's conception of epistemological realism. In their opinion theory is characterized by schematic correspondence with the reality. It regards current controversy between realists and antirealists and conditions of cognitive world view. The cognitive objectivism may increase through exploring and elimination subjective determinants. It considers the criterion of physical reality of the object of cognition, which was set up by F. Bonsack. This criterion is associated with invariable cognitive contents. In this article this criterion and its hypothetic character are shown.

  • Issue Year: 2007
  • Issue No: 40
  • Page Range: 30-58
  • Page Count: 19
  • Language: Polish
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