Dualizm, fałszywy monizm, monadologia: próba odpowiedzi na pytanie o status teoretyczny dualizmu psychofi zycznego w polemice Witkiewicza z Whiteheadem
Dualism, False Monism, Monadology: an Attempt to Answer the Question about Theoretical Status of Dualism in Witkiewicz–Whitehead Polemics

Summary/Abstract: The aim of the article is to decide whether Witkiewicz’s point of view on relation between physical objects and mind depends on the context of his writings: the latter may be of two kinds. The first one is connected with Witkiewicz’s own exposure of his ontology, the second one involves Witkiewicz’s polemical writings. The example taken for the article is Witkiewicz-Whitehead polemics. The main problem is: does Witkiewicz in the polemics refer to his own monadic concept or rather tries to point out that dualism should be thought as undoubted. Firstly, the article contains recapitulation of Whitehead’s denial to divide nature into two separate parts: physical objects and sense-data. The main part of the article involves analysis of Witkiewicz’s presentation of Whitehead’s construction. The analysis lead to the conclusion, that in a substantial part of Witkiewicz’s polemics the author refers to dualism understood as a undeniable ground for any ontological consideration: this way Witkiewicz in the chosen polemics reveals himself as a supporter of dualism.

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