THE QUA-PROBLEM AND MEANING SCEPTICISM
THE QUA-PROBLEM AND MEANING SCEPTICISM
Author(s): Samuel Paul DouglasSubject(s): Logic, Contemporary Philosophy, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Published by: Addleton Academic Publishers
Keywords: philosophy of language; causal theory; Kripke; meaning skepticism; meaning; reference;
Summary/Abstract: When considering potential solutions to meaning-scepticism, Kripke (1982) did not consider a causal-theoretic approach. Kusch (2006) has argued that this is due to the qua-problem. I consider Kusch’s criticism of Maddy (1984) and McGinn (1984) before offering a different way to solve the qua-problem, one that is not susceptible to sceptical attack. If this solution is successful, at least one barrier to using a causal theory to refute Kripke’s scepticism is removed.
Journal: Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations
- Issue Year: 2018
- Issue No: 17
- Page Range: 71-78
- Page Count: 8
- Language: English
- Content File-PDF
