CONTINUING QUESTIONS ABOUT FRIENDSHIP AS A CENTRAL MORAL VALUE Cover Image

CONTINUING QUESTIONS ABOUT FRIENDSHIP AS A CENTRAL MORAL VALUE
CONTINUING QUESTIONS ABOUT FRIENDSHIP AS A CENTRAL MORAL VALUE

Author(s): Ruth Abbey
Subject(s): Social Philosophy, Special Branches of Philosophy
Published by: Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk i Fundacja Filozofia na Rzecz Dialogu
Keywords: friendship; philia; agape; Mitias; Aristotle; Emerson

Summary/Abstract: This article engages Friendship: A Central Moral Value by Michael H. Mitias. It questions Mitias’ distinction between friendship as a moral and theoretical concern as opposed to a practical one. It distinguishes the narrow from the wide meanings of philiain Aristotle’s approach. It looks at the resonances of classical approaches in later theories of friendship, while also attending to the innovations of later thinkers. It suggests that the moral paradigms Mitias delineates might not be as hegemonic nor as hermetically sealed as he suggests. Mitias’ contribution is better understood as an addition to moral philosophy than to friendship studies.

  • Issue Year: 2018
  • Issue No: 2
  • Page Range: 65-80
  • Page Count: 16
  • Language: English
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