DEFINITION PER GENUS PROXIMUM ET DIFFERENTIAM SPECIFICAM AND LEGAL LANGUAGE: ARISTOTLE AND ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE Cover Image

ОПРЕДЕЛЕНИЕ PER GENUS PROXIMUM ET DIFFERENTIAM SPECIFICAM И ЮРИДИЧЕСКИЙ ЯЗЫК: АРИСТОТЕЛЬ И АНАЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ЮРИСПРУДЕНЦИЯ
DEFINITION PER GENUS PROXIMUM ET DIFFERENTIAM SPECIFICAM AND LEGAL LANGUAGE: ARISTOTLE AND ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE

Author(s): Valery Surovtsev, Vitaly Ogleznev
Subject(s): History of Law, Ancient Philosphy, Philosophy of Law
Published by: Новосибирский государственный университет
Keywords: Aristotle; definitio per genus proximum et differentiam specificam; legal language; analytical jurisprudence;

Summary/Abstract: The article is concerned with the general characteristics of Aristotle’s theory of a genus-differentia definition. The authors examine the validity of the definitions in the framework of legal language and present some objections against the definitions of per genus proximum et differentia specificam as they are considered by Aristotle. At the same time, through the objections to the position of genus-differentia definition critics, it is proved that in a number of cases Aristotle’s theory is more preferable than the approach offered by Herbert Hart, the proponent of analytical legal philosophy. The argument of Peter Hacker is used to reinstate Aristotle’s genus-differentia definitions.

  • Issue Year: XII/2018
  • Issue No: 1
  • Page Range: 108-121
  • Page Count: 14
  • Language: Russian
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