ЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ СТРУКТУРА ЭПИКУРЕЙСКОГО ВОЗРАЖЕНИЯ СКЕПТИКАМ ИЗ ADV. MATH. VIII, 337
THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE EPICUREAN OBJECTION TO SKEPTICS FROM ADV. MATH. VIII, 337

Summary/Abstract: In this article we are offering a method of analysis and formalization of the Epicurean objection to the Skeptics from the Adversus mathematicos VIII, 337, 6-9. We emphasize the importance of this objection for understanding Sextus Empiricus’ response to it, continuously discussed by the historians of philosophy. The Epicureans argue that the Skeptics cannot criticize their proof, because when the Skeptics are criticizing their proof, they think something different from the original proof, so that the original proof remains untouchable by any criticism. We explain in which sense the holistic assumption used by Sextus Empiricus and some philosophers before him can be used in the Epicurean objection to the Skeptics. In the final formalization we show that Epicureans’ argument can be interpreted as logically correct and deduced from sound premises. In the course of arguing for this thesis we are using the technical means of contemporary epistemic logic.

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