Wittgenstein despre scepticism în Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus și în Despre Certitudine
Wittgenstein on scepticism in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and On Certainty

Summary/Abstract: It is well known that in Wittgenstein’s philosophy we could identify two phases: before and after 1929. Concerning those periods, some philosophers as B. Russell or W. Stegmüller noticed a deep discontinuity. On the other side, authors as A. Kenny and R. Monk believed there is a continuity. Starting from those standpoints, the aim of this paper is to show that in Wittgenstein’s works, it is possible to talk about both continuity and discontinuity. In the case of scepticism rejection, we have a thematic continuity. In the situation of philosophical practice, we have a methodological discontinuity

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