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The subjective source of personal identity

Summary/Abstract: The paper deals with the personal identity issue in a subjective cognitive perspective, as Strawson puts it: How is it possible to distinguish in our subjective experience what is our ‘I’ and what’s not? The article presents a pragmatic concept of subjectivity and objectivity, based on Putnam’s conceptual relativity thesis. The concept recognizes them as two ways of understanding experience in a conceptual scheme of an appropriate type, and presents a role of ‘I’ in both of them. On this ground, the author introduces a key thesis which is the answer to the main issue: the recognition of ‘I’ in our experience is possible thanks to the fundamental function of mind which is the perception of the unity of experience. An illustration of this concept is the discussion with Nagel’s, Jackson’s, Churchland’s and Dennett’s accounts.

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