Implications of Paternalism and Buck-passing: A Reply to Quong
Implications of Paternalism and Buck-passing: A Reply to Quong
Author(s): Mats VolbergSubject(s): History of Philosophy, Philosophical Traditions, Special Branches of Philosophy
Published by: Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Keywords: paternalism; buck-passing
Summary/Abstract: In his latest book, Liberalism without Perfection (2011), Jonathan Quong argues against liberal perfectionism and defends Rawlsian political liberalism. In the course of his argumentation he presents us with a judgmental account of paternalism and the buck-passing account of truth in political philosophy. The aim of this paper is to critique both of those elements in Quong’s argumentation. I will first present the judgmental account of paternalism and then demonstrate that it will place impossible demands on us, insofar as paternalism is a prima facie wrong and we have a duty to reduce wrongness in the world. I will then turn to the buck-passing account of truth; after introducing it, I show that it will generate uncertain results for political philosophy, making it an unsatisfactory solution for the political liberal making truth claims in political philosophy
Journal: Polish Journal of Philosophy
- Issue Year: IX/2015
- Issue No: 1
- Page Range: 91-108
- Page Count: 18
- Language: English
- Content File-PDF