Why Verisimilitude Should Not Be Dependent on Conceptual Systems
Why Verisimilitude Should Not Be Dependent on Conceptual Systems

Summary/Abstract: Although I am not the person who is primarily attacked in Raclavský’s paper (2007), I’ve decided to comment on it critically. For, first of all, the paper was provoked by my paper (2007b), where I discussed the problem of the language dependence of some verisimilitude appraisals. This problem was formulated originally by D. Miller in a response to P. Tichý. In my opinion, Raclavský treats in a highly unfair and misleading way both the original problem as well as its author. Secondly, Raclavský’s own approach fails to solve this outstanding problem and tries to dissolve it by giving to a reader the illusion that it is perfectly natural if your verisimilitude appraisals are dependent on the conceptual system you are working within. Perhaps it is natural, but it is hardly acceptable. In these comments, at least, I shall try to show that Raclavský’s (2007) is so far from the truth (because of its deep mistakes) that it hardly counts as a serious contribution to the still lively discussion of „one of the fundamental problems in the philosophy of science” (Raclavský 2007, 334), namely, the problem of verisimilitude.

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