Expressibility and Truthmaker Maximalism: A Problem
Expressibility and Truthmaker Maximalism: A Problem
Author(s): J. Jeremy WisnewskiSubject(s): Epistemology, Logic, Analytic Philosophy
Published by: Filozofický ústav SAV
Keywords: truthmakers; maximalism; expressibility; D. M. Armstrong; analyticity;
Summary/Abstract: Advocates of truthmaker theory (like David Armstrong) regularly postulate both maximalism (that every truth has a truthmaker) and expressibility (that any truth can be expressed in a propostion). My aim in this paper is to demonstrate that these two theses are inconsistent, and hence that we must abandon one of them if we are to preserve truthmaker theory.
Journal: Organon F
- Issue Year: 14/2007
- Issue No: 1
- Page Range: 49-52
- Page Count: 4
- Language: English
