Moralno trebanje, autonomija i dobar život
MORAL OUGHT TO, AUTONOMY GOOD LIFE

Summary/Abstract: Starting from the crucial dispute of Being and ought, the author discusses the matters of validity, legitimacy and moral foundation. Basically, the author opposes the positions of the validity ethics, realistic philosophy of morality, »intuitive metaphysics of the good* which he considers to be cryptometaphysical and quasitheological construction. Between different versions of value-athical »subjectivism« and value- -ethical »objectivism«, the author endeavours to find new possibilities of comprehension of the validity question. He disassociates himself from ethical utilitarianism and positivism as radically ethical subjectivism. The author’s position could be expressed by a thesis, that an alternative of intersubjectivity could be offered instead of radical subjectivism and metaphysical »objectivism« (within the problem of moral foundation and the legitimacy of validity), namely that »pluralism of interlevels « should be considered in the realm of moral action and evaluation. The author’s opinion is that the practical philosophy could hardly exist without the presupposition of the (inter)subjectivity structure, in which only ought can have intersubjective objectivity.

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