Minimal models and minimal objects
Minimal models and minimal objects

Summary/Abstract: The concept to be treated in this paper will be twofold. On the one hand, the concept of a minimal model will play a role in how we describe the objects of our theories, while on the other hand, the concept of minimal object will provide a description of a type of reduction of the core objects we treat in our theories. Interestingly, despite the apparent relation between both concepts, they play out in different arenas. First, a minimal model is set as the epistemological ground through which theories can be developed. However, a minimal object will have an ontological bearing in that the constitutive elements of a theory constrain what can or cannot be included in our models by virtue of their elementary aspect. Despite the fact that both concepts, when applied, can present important changes in the development of our theories, I will argue that there is a conceptual core that retains a degree of coherence in both sides. That is, in no case will any of either possible conceptualizations become fixed and deterministic, for each change produced in our conceptualizations will entail changes to itself and to the other aspect of the conceptual duality that is treated here. Taking into account both concepts, we can think about the particular case of general semiotics and to what degree these can be applied to it across its many branches. It will be argued in this paper that the core concepts of semiotics – namely semiosis and the sign relation – cannot be entailed by a singular mode of analysis and that judgements in semiotics always entail both conceptualizations.

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