Une institution qui n’a pas tenu ses promesses: le référendum de révocation présidentielle en Roumanie
Une institution qui n’a pas tenu ses promesses: le référendum de révocation présidentielle en Roumanie

Summary/Abstract: The referendum on the impeachment of the president of Romania pursuant to article 95 of the Romanian Constitution, distinguishes itself through the personal nature of its objective. Because it inevitably channels institutional tensions, this type of vote must be controlled by clear, stable and effective regulations. In this regard, the precedents set by the 2007 and 2012 referendums offer a few lessons. Issues ranging from the majority and quorum required, the composition of the electorate, the motives and accusations sufficient for triggering the referendum procedure and the political or judicial nature of the Constitutional Court’s power sparked much controversy regarding the rules of the game involved in referendum democracy. A referendum doesn’t operate in a vacuum: it depends on and is supported by representative democracy to set the rules of the game, and the questions submitted to the population are often the continuation of debates and tensions that already divide elected representatives. In the case of Romania, the political potential of the referendum resulting from article 95, as an instrument for partisan warfare and conflict resolution in periods of cohabitation, seems, for the moment, to have triumphed over the more judicial nature of this institution as the implementation of presidential accountability in the case of serious unconstitutional behaviour.

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