Erazm i Luter o wolnej woli
Erasmus and Luther on free will

Summary/Abstract: The author discusses the controversy between Erasmus and Luther over free will. He recapitulates the position of Erasmus who identified three conceptions of free will attributing them to Pelagius, Duns Scotus and Martin Luther, respectively. Erasmus firmly rejected only the last one. The author also presents the Luther’s view that the exercise of free will would collide with the working of divine grace that forcesto reject the existence of free will. This controversy revitalizes a mediaeval problem, still highly inspirational. Is God at least partly responsible for our sins? Was He accountable for hardening the pharaoh’s heart (Ex 4: 21)? Was it approved by God that Judas would betray Jesus? Erasmus proposes an interesting solution to this problem that the author of this article finds bright and proper. It is based on the distinction between ‘the necessity of the consequence’ and the ‘necessity of the consequent’. The ‘necessity of the consequence’ is the acceptance of a logical implication together with its antecedent. In this case the consequent is entailed by logical inference (by ponendo ponens). Acceptance of this formula is equivalent to acting as an accomplice. The ‘necessity of the consequent’, however, is limited to the endorsing of the implication together with its consequent, but without accepting the antecedent. On these conditions the endorsement is no more than a concession for the occurrence of the fact implied, but it does not involve a volitional partnership in the act. To be more specific: God hardened the pharaoh’s heart and thereby He acted in collusion with the pharaoh. In the case of Judas, however, God only condescended that Judas would betray Jesus without cooperating in the act. Thus the will of pharaoh’s was weakened, or presumably deactivated, while Judas was free to act as he pleased, availing himself of his free will.

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