Power Index vs Maintaining the Control of the Firm – the Optimal Division of the Ownership and the Governance Cover Image

Indeks siły a zachowanie kontroli nad firmą – optymalny podział własności i władzy
Power Index vs Maintaining the Control of the Firm – the Optimal Division of the Ownership and the Governance

Author(s): Anna Motylska-Kuźma
Subject(s): Business Economy / Management, Micro-Economics, Methodology and research technology
Published by: Społeczna Akademia Nauk
Keywords: power index; family firms; ownership structure; government structure; Shapley–Shubik index; Banzhalf–Coleman index;

Summary/Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to analyse the possibility of using the power index as a determinant of optimal division of the ownership, especially in family businesses. Based on the previous research about the power index in the group decision making processes and the characteristic expectations of the family firms, the author shows the possible optimal division of the ownership, which could be use in different situations and phase of life cycle of the firm. There are assessed the advantages and disadvantages of power indices. The main feature is that power index, independent from model, fulfils very well the core needs of family businesses and significantly helps to build an optimal governance and ownership structure.

  • Issue Year: 19/2018
  • Issue No: 7.2
  • Page Range: 73-88
  • Page Count: 16
  • Language: Polish