IDEEA DE NEDREPTATE SOCIALĂ
Idea Of Social Injustice
Author(s): Adrian Paul IliescuSubject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti
Keywords: social (un)justice; constitutional negotiations; threat capacity; Nash equilibrium; shareholders; stakeholders
Summary/Abstract: The article tries to clarify the very idea of social unjustice, by using a familiar kind of mental experiment. Deep resources inequality is shown to lead to great differences in negotiation power, which in turn lead to a incapacity (of disadvantaged people) to defend their constitutional interests. The Nash problem is used in order to show how resources inequality, together with some apparently unobjectionable conventions, lead to big differences in the possibility of influencing the shape of constitutional arrangements. The very distinction between shareholders and stakeholders appears to be a (difficult to justify) result of these mix between inequalities and conventions.
Journal: Revista Română de Filosofie Analitică
- Issue Year: III/2009
- Issue No: 1
- Page Range: 27-43
- Page Count: 17
- Language: Romanian