Private Antitrust Enforcement Without Punitive Damages: A Half-Baked Reform?
Private Antitrust Enforcement Without Punitive Damages: A Half-Baked Reform?
Author(s): Claudia MassaSubject(s): Business Economy / Management, Commercial Law
Published by: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Keywords: competition law; private antitrust enforcement; compensation; punitive damages;deterrence;
Summary/Abstract: Directive 2014/104/EU on private antitrust enforcement opted for the exclusion of punitive damages from the category of recoverable damages following a violation of antitrust law. This article will outline the concept of punitive damages and analyse the relevant case-law of the courts of the Member States, of the ECtHR and of the ECJ. Then, it will examine the regime laid down in the Directive and consider the possible reasons why the European legislator opted for this exclusion. Thus, the opportunity to introduce such a provision into the European legal system will be evaluated, taking into consideration the problem of overdeterrence, the problem of the division of functions between public and private enforcement, and making a comparison with the relevant provisions of Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights. Finally, a possible modification of Article 3(3) of the Directive will be suggested, in the framework of the review that the Commission is required to undertake by December 27, 2020.
Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies (YARS)
- Issue Year: 11/2018
- Issue No: 17
- Page Range: 93-111
- Page Count: 19
- Language: English