Da li je postojanje ponekad predikat?
Is existence never a predicate?

Summary/Abstract: I want to discuss the doctrine that existence is not a predicate, in connection with two particular classes of utterances. I begin by considering spoken or written utterances of sentences containing the singular names of fictional or mythical characters as these occur in the actual telling of the story or recounting of the myth. There was a time when some philosophers felt the need to produce analyses of sentences containing such fictional or mythical names, analyses which would, for example, have the character of straightforwardly true-or-false reports of what was to be found in certain books. There are, one might say, two types of classical solution here, two classical models for interpreting our sentences. The exercise I want to propose is that of inquiring whether we could not find another model which would preserve a predicative role for ‘exists’ without casting the subject-expression for the somewhat ungrateful role of singular term referring to a concept.

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