Why Legal Conventionalism Fails
Why Legal Conventionalism Fails
Author(s): Adam DyrdaSubject(s): Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence, Philosophy of Law, Philosophy of Law
Published by: Stowarzyszenie Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej – Sekcja Polska IVR
Keywords: legal conventionalism; Andrei Marmor; Scott J. Shapiro; Emil Lagerspetz
Summary/Abstract: The term “legal conventionalism” covers a set of broadly discussed legal theories explaining the fact of law’s existence by reference to the “conventional rule of recognition”. Some of them are aspiring to be so-called “fully fledged theories of law” and explain the normativity of law by reference to the same fundamental, conventional fact. The article presents some recently discussed views (including the ideas of E. Lagerspetz, A. Marmor, S. Shapiro) alongside with counter-arguments showing why conventionalism fails. Eventually, the basic points of critique can be shaped in terms of the distinction between instrumental and substantial reason.
Journal: Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
- Issue Year: 10/2015
- Issue No: 1
- Page Range: 14-30
- Page Count: 17
- Language: English