Czy amerykańska jurysprudencja posiada reguły interpretacji Konstytucji?
Does American jurisprudence have any rules of interpretation of Constitution?
Author(s): Anna TomzaSubject(s): Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, Philosophy of Law, Philosophy of Law
Published by: Stowarzyszenie Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej – Sekcja Polska IVR
Keywords: American jurisprudence; legal interpretation; rules of interpretation; Constitution
Summary/Abstract: The most discussed issue in the theory of law is the problem of its interpretation, and main question in this topic is – how to make a proper interpretation? The American common-law, opposite the European theory of law, seems not to have general rules of interpretation, but only the idea of proper interpretation. Also the methodology of statutory interpretation is some kind of the judge-made law. As Henry M. Hart said „The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation”. According to this, currently the question focuses on finding the generally rules of interpretation, which should be some kind of canons of the statutory interpretation. This article tries to give the answer to the question: „if American jurisprudence has any rules of interpretation of law?”.
Journal: Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
- Issue Year: 9/2014
- Issue No: 2
- Page Range: 125-133
- Page Count: 9
- Language: Polish