Problem predmetnosti u mladog Marxa
The Problem of Materialism as Viewed by Young Marx

Summary/Abstract: The theme of this work is the problem of materialism as viewed at in Marx’s Philosophical-Economic manuscripts. By this theme the author wants to place the fundamental conflict between Marx and philosophy previous to him — first of all, his conflict with Hegel and Feuerbach, — in what and how real is. The problem is approached by appointing the essential Marx’s objections to Hegel's philosophy, the concept of materialism in eluded, and the determination of man implicated in the concept. Hegel thinks about materialism as about the manifestation of consciousness and thus, as an act of consciousness it can be abo¬lished. Materialism determined in such a way is, for Marx, merely a reality (Ding- heit), merely a creature of consciousness, but not anything real. In the same way, man in this philosophy appears only in determination of consciousness, as conscious¬ness, and thinking is his only acting act. Marx founds materialism essentially associated to man relation of his »materia¬listic essence, subjectivity of human essential powers«, towards the world, which is a material in which those essential powers are validated and acted. This is an active relation in which materialization of material and materializa¬tion of human essential powers are mutually validated. This mutual reinstatement is (human) history. However, beside this »ontological« approach, Marx approaches the problem of materialism concretely, historically, from the position of determined historical sup¬positions. In this context he speaks about an alienated form of materialism, as it exists on the basis of private property, as its concrete historical supposition.. Materialization is, according to this supposition, also alienation, human essence is alienated in the act of materialization, as well as materialism itself. The third form of materialism is appointed on, for Marx, still unreal, hypothe¬tic supposition of the »abolished private property«, »social society« or communism as a real humanism. According to this supposition of materialism would be deprived of its alienated form, it should become »really human« materialism, directly human materialism. This form of materialism is realised by a pure logical argumentation as a negation of negation of the previous form.

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