Problem osoby w świetle neuronauk. Czy osoba to jedynie użyteczna metafora?
The Person in Light of Neuroscience: Is a Person Only a Useful Metaphor?
Author(s): Józef BremerSubject(s): Christian Theology and Religion, Philosophy, Special Branches of Philosophy, Theology and Religion, Religion and science , Philosophy of Religion
Published by: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
Keywords: Cartesian dualism; reductionist theory of the person; eliminational theory of the person; metaphysical theory of the person; emergentist theory of the person; neuroplasticity; neuroscience
Summary/Abstract: Starting from John Paul II’s critique of Cartesianism, this article shows the influence of the latter on the emergence of empirical-positivist (Gerhard Roth) and eliminational (Daniel C. Dennett) theories of the person that consider man merely a useful metaphor. The philosopher Peter F. Strawson and the neurologist Roger W. Sperry, who came up with the metaphysical and emergentist theories of the person, respectively, support the idea that the person is not merely illusory and metaphorical. An exclusively metaphorical understanding of the person also contradicts current research on neuroplasticity, as both studies on people with obsessive-compulsive disorder and the treatment of patients after the stroke demonstrate.
Journal: Studia Teologii Dogmatycznej
- Issue Year: 2018
- Issue No: 4
- Page Range: 11-27
- Page Count: 17
- Language: Polish