O úlohe metafyziky pri odôvodňovaní ľudských práv
On the Role of Metaphysics in Justifying Human Rights

Summary/Abstract: When justifying human rights we can essentially rely on two different types of reasons: facts and metaphysics. Against the first kind of justification Hume’s thesis is standardly raised. According to this thesis it is not possible to derive a normative conclusion from a set of purely descriptive premises. Against the second kind of justification it is usually objected that metaphysics is too speculative to secure a solid ground for a consensus in pluralistic societies. In the following text I will try to interchange the targets at which these objections are usually aimed: I will challenge the factual justification of human rights by the objection of speculation and at the same time I will raise Hume’s thesis against the metaphysical justification of human rights. My conclusion is that human rights, same as any other norms, can by justified only by normative premises regardless of their metaphysical nature.

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