Да се мисли Ръсел като трансцендентален логик
To Think Russell as a Transcendental Logician

Summary/Abstract: This article, which is not thinking on Russell but thinking through him – it could be said, with him and against him – is experimental; and somewhat outrageous to those who are possessed by the dogmas of the method of logical analysis. It is outrageous both by its general idea – ‘to think Russell as a transcendental logician’; and by the choice of one of the disturbing puzzles of Russell’s logic of relations – that, according to his own metaphor, relations seem to proceed from referent to relatum – for the purpose of extracting logical data that testify how productive it is to think Russell as one. For those, however, who are not so obsessed, there will hardly be any outrage – especially if they first carefully consider the problem, not singled out by Russell scholars (and neither by Russell himself) of the demarcation between formal and philosophical logic in Russell. And if they then become aware that wherever discusses the relation’s going from referent to relatum, the problem is far from being only one (as he is inclined to think). In fact, the logical data themselves testify that they are three – a) of the ‘proceeding of the relation itself’, b) of the ‘proceeding of affirmation in the relational proposition’, and c) that it is somehow indicated in the ‘relation’ which its ‘converse’ will be (is there anybody who would not be perplexed if told that the converse of ‘a father of’ is ‘lying under’?). Once again on the article’s title: it only proposes ‘thinking Russell as a transcendental logician’ rather than claiming that he is one; and what would be the outrage in that, especially if this endeavour proves productive?

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