A Critique on McGinn Counterarguments on Russell’s Theory of Existence
A Critique on McGinn Counterarguments on Russell’s Theory of Existence

Summary/Abstract: The aim of this paper is to present a critique of McGinn’s argumentsagainst the Russellian approach of existence. According to McGinn,existence should be considered a proper predicate. In this case,formally it cannot be equated with the existential quantifier. For abetter understanding of the orthodox view (i.e. Russell’s approach), ashort presentation of it is needed. Hence, I am going to brieflypresent Russell’s main ideas about existence. If McGinn rejects thatexistence can and should be expressed using the existentialquantifier, Russell argues for the opposite. The next step consistsin a brief presentation of the counterarguments McGinn providesfor the orthodox approach. In the last section of the paper I amgoing to present some critiques for some of the counterargumentsMcGinn provides. Some of them seem to be quite strong, butothers fail to reach their aim.However, I should add that I do not agree at all with theequivalence between existence and the existential quantifier. But,if one wants to reject such an account it has to have pretty strongcounterarguments. McGinn’s ones do not seem to be as strong ashe wished them to be.I.

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