Je rozhodovací procedura v Radě Evropské unie spravedlivá?
Is the EU Council Decision-Making Rule Equitable?
Author(s): Bĕla PlechanovováSubject(s): Politics / Political Sciences
Published by: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů
Keywords: weighted voting; Banzhaf index; Council of the EU; Constitutional Treaty; representative democracy;
Summary/Abstract: A priori voting power analysis can provide an effective tool for the assessment of decision-making procedures, which is particularly necessary for procedures using weighted voting. The Council of the EU is such a case, and the decision-making rule for this central decision-making body has been a long-lasting problem for the European Union. This article gives a short introduction to the broader context of weighted voting and to the measurement of voting power, demonstrating the effects of various forms of weighted-vote decision-making on the influence (voting power) of individual actors. The article provides a comparison of the effects of decision-making procedures for the Council on the voting power of member states, mainly focusing on the institutional design provided by the Constitutional Treaty. It concludes that the Treaty would – if implemented – provide a notably worse solution than the current procedure, particularly from the perspective of equal representation of EU citizens.
Journal: Mezinárodní vztahy
- Issue Year: 41/2006
- Issue No: 1
- Page Range: 5-22
- Page Count: 18
- Language: Czech