Субективно оправдаване в етиката и епистемологията
Subjective Justification in Ethics and Epistemology

Summary/Abstract: This article deals with the externalist approach to subjective justification, which grounds the latter upon cognitive integration of our faculties or virtues. The crucial assumption in this theory is that cognitive integration must be motivated by our aiming at the truth. By analogy, the approach is applicable to subjective justification in the moral domain. One would be subjectively justified in making a moral decision, if that decision resulted from an integrated moral character, and if the integration was motivated by our aiming at the good. I claim that this approach has the same kind of drawback in both domains. My claim is that adding the motivation component of achieving the truth or the good is possible only by introducing the requirement of reflection, and therefore externalism with regard to subjective justification is not sustainable. My argument is based on Kahneman (2011) who shows that our belief formation and decision-making is affected by cognitive biases, such as those related to ease, speed and conformist thinking. These biases are subjectively indistinguishable from reliable processes that aim at the truth. Thus, motivation to achieve the truth cannot be controlled without reflection upon the relevant processes.

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