THE FREE WILL DEFENSE REVISITED: THE INSTRUMENTAL VALUE OF SIGNIFICANT FREE WILL
THE FREE WILL DEFENSE REVISITED: THE INSTRUMENTAL VALUE OF SIGNIFICANT FREE WILL

Summary/Abstract: Alvin Plantinga has famously responded to the logical problem of evil by appealingto the intrinsic value of significant free will. A problem, however, arises becausetraditional theists believe that both God and the redeemed who go to heaven cannotdo wrong acts. This entails that both God and the redeemed in heaven lacksignificant freedom. If significant freedom is indeed valuable, then God and theredeemed in heaven would lack something intrinsically valuable. However, ifsignificant freedom is not intrinsically valuable, then Plantinga’s reply to the logicalproblem of evil fails. In this paper, we assess three contemporary solutions to thedilemma above. The first is the love solution, which proposes that significant freedomis necessary for agents to love, and loving others is intrinsically good. The second isthe soul-making solution, which argues that significant freedom is necessary for selfdeveloping one’s moral character, and having a self-developed moral character isintrinsically good. The third is the derivative free will solution, which argues thatsignificant freedom is necessary for derivative free will in heaven, and derivative freewill is intrinsically good. We raise problems against all three solutions and insteaddefend a fourth solution – the ultimate responsibility solution. That is, SF isinstrumentally valuable as it gives agents ultimate responsibility with regards tomorally significant acts. Finally, we defend the ultimate responsibility solutionagainst two major objections

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