VOLONTE, ACTION ET NORMATIVITE (HUSSERL ET KANT)
WILL, ACTION, AND NORMATIVITY (HUSSERL AND KANT)

Summary/Abstract: Will, Action, and Normativity (Husserl and Kant). The unitary description both of the thing and of the other allowed to the Husserlian phenomenology to overcome the classical distinction between representation and will and to treat the volition and action as specific objects. In the following paper we shall investigate the basic concepts of a phenomenology of will and action comparing it with Kant’s position in this respect. Our research will focus on the phenomenological description of the passage from the inchoative moment of the action to the action to the ethical action and on the manner in which normativity arises in the milieu of the interaction. Korsgaard’s concept of reflective endorsement will be our main reference in this field.

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