Morálna zodpovednosť bez alternatívnych možností? Frankfurtov argument v prospech kompatibilizmu a jeho kritika
Moral Responsibility without Alternative Possibilities?

Summary/Abstract: The article deals with famous examples against Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). Frankfurt-style examples suggest that moral responsibility is consistent with a lack of alternative possibilities and thus are strong back up for compatibilist position. The article introduces Frankfurt’s argument and analyzes main critique against it’s metaphysical and moral basis. Finally it evaluates situation between its defenders and oppontents as undecisive. Eventhough libertarians defend PAP effectively, ingenious counter-examples stay legitimate and important part of compatibilist argumentation. In the conclusion emerge questions about place of Frankfurt-style examples in the debate of free will towards Consequence argument. Why are these two arguments competitive and what is the problem both of them have to deal with?

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