Pojam razumevanja u hermeneutici i fundamentalnoj ontologiji. Diltaj, Gadamer, Hajdeger
Concept of Understanding in Hermeneutics and Fundamental Ontology. Dilthey, Gadamer, Heidegger

Summary/Abstract: Ever since the Aristotle’s teaching of interpretation, the problem of interpretation – and understanding – is an ultimate trial of every onto-logics, becouse it has been one of the main interests of philosophy in general, which is evident also in contemporary philosophical conceptions. This paper is focused on confrontation of two contemporary approaches to the problem of understanding, marked as hermeneutical and fundamental ontological, and its basic intention is to show possibilities of an authentic consideration of meaning of understanding itself. This undertaking goes through thematization of three leading hypothesis. Firstly. In Dilthey’s opinion the notion of understanding is essentially subordinated to the notion of interpretation and attached to the grounding of human sciences, in opposition to the explanation and in connection with experience (Erlebnis). Secondly. Gadamer’s analysis of understanding, despite of his explicit referring to Heidegger, remains in the realm of hermeneutical tradition, although it exceeds it in many respects, but bears none major significance to the notion of understanding itself. Thirdly. In Heidegger’s philosophy the notion of understanding is the manner of being and as such it considerably overpasses the horizon in which that notion was considered before and after.

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