Teorija istine i naučni realizam u poperovoj filozofiji nauke
Theory of Truth and Scientific Realism in Popper’s Philosophy of Science

Summary/Abstract: Popper’s critical rationalism together with its result – the idea of qualitative growth of scientific knowledge – require a concept of truth in order to reach its full meaning. Because of his anti-inductivism, Popper’s concept of truth serves as a regulative principle of scientific knowledge (based on Tarski’s semantic theory of truth), while the concept of verisimilitude should characterise the relation between scientific theories and the truth. However, the paper shows that such a conception of truth, and therefore Popper’s scientific realism as well, contain contradictory statements. Furthermore, Popper’s critical rationalism and scientific realism stand in a relation of mutual presupposition, so that without each other the meaning is lost, producing additional tensions between these two ideas within Popper’s work.

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