Роналд Дворкин смисао објективног важења вредносних судова
Ronald Dworkin - The Purpose Of The Objective Truth Of Value Judgments In Morals And Law

Summary/Abstract: Ronald Dworkin advocates an epistemological position of inner scepticism, applied to people's value judgments in the fields of ethics, morals, law, esthetics. Inner scepticism is characterized by the belief that it is neither possible nor desirable to be sceptical all the way through. Notably, there are certain value assessments or substantive value judgments which can be affirmed as objectively truthful. According to this opinion, it is possible to have pluralism of values, as well as a historic evolution of value assessments, while it is not possible to give final value judgments on specific actions, developments and personalities. At the same time, a structurally indefinite position can always find a practical solution in a more general substantive value judgment. Dworkin concludes that substantive indefinite judgments are possible in law, too, and that legal statements can be substantively negative, positive or indefinite. Indefinite judgments in law are sceptical, just as in any other filed of value. Nonetheless, Dworkin's opinion is that in the field of law, indefinite judgments have negative consequences for the inherent need of law to bring about specific decisions, and he opposes contemporary post-modern tendencies in law with a thesis that irresolvable cases in law are very rare, and that 'difficult cases' are, in principle, resolvable at a higher level of abstraction within the framework of the legal theory itself, as well as in the light of its accordance with political morality and philosophical ethics.

• Details
• Contents